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Shipping as a Knowledge Industry:
Research and Strategic Planning
at Ocean Group
Niels P. Petersson
Introduction
One of the most important transformations of the post-war world was the
rise of what some contemporaries called the knowledge society. Knowl-
edge created in the social and natural sciences now increasingly perme-
ated society and with it the corporate world. This chapter approaches the
question of how transformations in the world of shipping relate to wider
trends in business and general history through the lens of knowledge. It
will investigate how technological and managerial knowledge was created,
developed and exploited as a corporate resource from the 1950s onwards
in Ocean Transport and Trading, one of the UK’s leading liner shipping
firms. The chapter will, first, briefly discuss the resource-based view of the
firm and the importance of knowledge as a corporate resource. It will then
examine Ocean’s use of technological and operational knowledge in the
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post-war era. The following section examines the introduction of modern
management concepts at Ocean from the late 1960s and their impact on
corporate strategy. In conclusion, the chapter will argue that the introduc-
tion of managerial concepts of knowledge contributed to Ocean’s gradual
withdrawal from shipping and transformation into a provider of global
logistics services and that analyzing shipping as a knowledge industry helps
make sense of the transformation of the industry.
Knowledge as a Resource
The resource-based view of the firmwas first developed byEdith Penrose in
the 1950s. It has been widely adopted in management and organization
studies since the 1980s to inform research into how firms can identify
and develop their competitive advantage, enhance their performance and
nurture ‘dynamic capabilities’ that allow them to adapt to changingmarket
conditions.1 The key assumption of the resource-based view is that the
firm is best analyzed as a set of specific resources under the control of
the management. One of the key resources identified by Penrose was
knowledge. Later work has placed knowledge at the centre of an economic
theory of the firm, regarding the firm as an organization concerned with
integrating individuals’ specialist knowledge for use in the production of
goods and services.2
The literature distinguishes a number of types of knowledge and ways
of using knowledge. Tacit knowledge is implicit, informal, personalised,
and usually based on experience and skills rather than formal learning—
qualities that wouldmake it difficult to replicate and communicate, giving
a firm controlling such knowledge a competitive advantage. At the same
time, tacit knowledge does not easily feed into training, research, and
discussion, making its systematic development and adaptation difficult.
Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is easily communicated, managed,
stored, distributed, often actively created through research and reporting,
1Penrose (1959). For an overview of Penrose’s impact, see Christos Pitelis’s introduction in the
2009 edition of her work, ix–xlvii. Notable later contributions includeWernerfelt (1984, 1995) and
Barney (1991, 2001) as well as Teece (2016).
2Grant (1996) and Spender (1996).
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and ultimately also bought and sold. It is easier to use, but not necessar-
ily a durable foundation of competitive advantage unless its use can be
restricted, for example through patents.
The resource-based view emphasizes the crucial role of a firm’s manage-
ment, describing it as ‘the primary task of management … to maximize
value through the optimal deployment of existing resources and capabili-
ties, while developing the firm’s resource base for the future’.3 Managers’
capacity to do so under conditions of ‘deep uncertainty’ over the develop-
ment of markets, inputs and outputs has been discussed under the heading
of a firm’s ‘dynamic capabilities’.4
Scholars working within this framework have occasionally pointed to
the benefits to be derived from historical research as ‘the conditions under
which resources are developed or acquired in one period have implications
for the strategic advantages of firms in subsequent periods’, and resources
may lose their value if the market that determines their usefulness dis-
appears.5 ‘Firm-level history’ has been proposed as one way of finding
out ‘how firm resources and capabilities are accumulated and eroded’ and
‘how resources’ relative values may be affected by market changes’.6 At
the same time, work on knowledge as a resource also suggests a number
of questions that are potentially useful for business historians. On a basic
level, these relate to the extent to which knowledge was recognized as a
key resource by managers and entrepreneurs and to changes in the type
of knowledge used, the personnel hired and the organizational structures
created to develop or deploy such knowledge.More difficult, but alsomore
interesting, are questions around the consequences of such changes in the
use of knowledge—how did they affect corporate strategy and, ultimately,
corporate success? Such questions provide a useful framework for analyzing
the development of shipping in the post-war era. Like many other indus-
tries, shipping underwent profound and complex, internal and external
transformations. As explained in Chapter 1 in this volume, the technol-
ogy, business organization, and geographic focus of the industry changed,
3Grant (1996, 110).
4Teece (2016, 204). Jones et al. (2013) and Henrik Sornn-Friese in this volume analyse dynamic
capabilities in a shipping context.
5Barney (2001, 51).
6Priem and Butler (2001, 35).
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resulting in profound shifts in competitive advantage. How did managers
make sense of such transformations, how did they respond, what role did
knowledge play in their response, and which were the consequences of
the knowledge they used and the way they used it? Over the rest of this
chapter, a resource-based perspective will be used to explore the changing
use of knowledge in the industry.
Technology and Operations
Improving Traditional Liner Shipping
In the 1950s, the technology of cargo shipping that had not seen much
innovation for decades began to change, mainly due to two developments:
rising volumes of trade and rising wages, in particular for manual labour-
ers such as dockworkers and seafarers. Shipowners responded by running
larger, faster ships with smaller crews and more automated systems. From
the 1950s onwards, ‘supertankers’ and large bulk carriers increased effi-
ciency and brought down costs. In liner shipping, Ocean’s main business,
such rationalization was impossible as long as cargoes were highly diverse
and essentially had to be stowed by hand. By the mid-1960s, tanker size
had increased by 82% and tramp and bulk carrier size by 52%, but cargo
liner size only by 14%. Cargo liners spent 60% of their time in port, and
freight handling could account for over one-third of the total annual cost,
including depreciation, of running a cargo liner.7
Ocean’s naval architects in the 1950s knew that their ships were out-
dated and initiated a programme of research into optimal ship design.
Ocean was among the first shipping companies to research the perfor-
mance of its ships under real-world conditions, using current data as well
as company archives to construct data series. Even by the late 1960s,
most shipping companies lacked trained technical staff and had done lit-
tle research in areas that were crucial for their operations and profitability,
while much of the research undertaken by public bodies and shipowner
associations lacked relevance or studied technologies without looking at
7van den Burg (1969, 11).
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their economic costs and benefits.8 Research on operating costs hadmostly
focused on fuel economy, which however was not amajor concern in times
of cheap fuel. Ocean’s research now allowed to quantify the disproportion-
ate increase of stevedoring costs and of time lost in port. Sea time had fallen
from 200 days per year in 1950 to 180 in 1962. Keeping stevedoring costs
in check, speeding up loading and reducing crew size therefore became
the key considerations in designing the last generation of Ocean’s cargo-
liners to enter service before the container age.9 The new ships, the Priam
and Glenlyon classes, were designed with large and easily accessible cargo
spaces. This made them more expensive to build as they were larger and
heavier than strictly necessary to accommodate their cargo, but their spa-
cious, more regularly shaped holds allowed savings where it mattered—the
cost of time and labour when loading and unloading.10 The newer ships
also could sail with smaller crews than their predecessors. While officer
numbers were unchanged, only 29 ratings were required, against over 60
on older ships. Reducing crew size was a concern as the share of wages had
risen from 10% of voyage costs in 1930 to 26.7% in 1963 and a shortage
of seafarers had begun to emerge.11
Naval architects praised Ocean’s research-based approach to the design
of new ships, highlighting ‘the commercial advantages … which could
accrue from proper investigation of the design aspects at the right time
and not, as so frequently happens, after construction of the ship has com-
menced’.12 However, these efforts had their drawbacks. With the Priam
class ships, the ‘thinking anddesigning period, combinedwith the building
period, covered no less than 4½ years’.13 Over these years, market condi-
tions had changed substantially. The Suez crisis briefly dented growth and
decolonization and political unrest in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
cast doubts over the economic development of key ports to be serviced
8Goss (1998), Goss (2011), and Committee of Inquiry into Shipping (1970, 199–204).
9Meek (1964, 243).
10Ibid., 242, 246.
11Falkus (1990, 310); see King (2000, 58–60) on the labour market for seafarers.
12Meek (1964, 279).
13Meek and Adams (1969, 271).
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by the new ships.14 After a period of hesitation the ships were redesigned
to make them faster and offer more refrigerated cargo space so that they
could be used on different routes.15 The Glenlyon and Priam class ships
were superseded almost as soon as they were delivered and eventually saw
their service lives cut short by containerization.
Alongside technological change, operational improvements were con-
stantly being made based on in-house research. Ocean created a dedicated
research department in 1964, and a cargo superintendent was appointed
to investigate the causes of the rise in cargo handling costs in various
ports and suggest remedies.16 Yet, while substantial reductions in operat-
ing costs were achieved, these were far from game-changing and could not
keep pace with the rapid increase in the costs of labour, credit, fuel etc.
through the 70s. Even radical proposals such as the 1970s German study
of the ‘ship of the future’ run by a minimal, versatile crew, and similar
British studies of the ‘Efficient Ship’ undertaken in the 1980s were unable
to fully compensate for such cost pressures.17
Overall, Ocean’s experience with in-house research was mixed. Only
limited potential for increased efficiency in traditional liner shipping was
discovered. The main obstacles to increased efficiency and profitability
in liner shipping were to be found not on board but in the way cargo
and labour were organised in port. Meanwhile, the decision to design
in-house and order purpose-built ships slowed down the introduction of
technological innovation. Ships embodying state of the art 1950s opera-
tional and technological research were brought into service at a time when
the fundamental break-through of containerization was already around
the corner. Moreover, it was not necessarily rational for shipping com-
panies to do their design and research in-house when such explicit and
transferable knowledge could be bought off-the-shelf or developed by spe-
cialized outside organizations. Ocean’s chairman himself came to realize
that designing ships in-house had ‘produced toomany expensive mistakes’
14For the development of Ocean’s main markets in these years, see Nick White’s chapter in this
volume.
15Falkus (1990, 323–328).
16Ibid., 310.
17For the Ship of the Future, see Ocean’s summary ‘A note on the V.D.R. experiment’, 27 November
1974, 4.B.2328, for the Efficient Ship Daily Telegraph (2013).
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and getting shipyards to build one-off designs had become prohibitively
costly.18 Finally, the application of knowledge remained patchy, and key
economic factors such as the expected life of ships, their second-hand or
scrap value, and the estimated distribution of revenues and operating costs
over their service lives were not considered at all.19 This had an effect on
Ocean’s profitability, its ability to finance fleet replacement, and ultimately
the value of the company as a whole.
The Leap into Container Shipping
If innovation in conventional liner shipping was methodical but limited
and slow, containerization represented a deliberate and abrupt leap into
the dark, both in commercial and in technological terms. Initially, Ocean
was sceptical about the potential of containerization. However, early stud-
ies had assumed that containers would be used alongside conventionally
packed cargo in conventional ships.20 Moreover, the problems that made
containers attractive were only getting worse: port labour costs continued
to rise, without any increase in productivity. In London, the real cost of
loading cargo tripled during the 1960s. On the London-Sydney route,
cargo handling costs represented 36% of round voyage costs in 1960 and
64% in 1970. Escalating stevedoring costs were aggravated by strikes.
Liner ship owners saw the cost of cargo handling as the key reason for
their lack of profitability and were looking for a long-term solution.21
When American competitors Sea-Land began to plan the containeriza-
tion of Australian traffic, Ocean was quick to realise that this required
a response. Chairman Sir John Nicholson argued that containers were
‘bound to present such cost advantages to shippers / receivers … as to be
an inevitable development’, and he concluded: ‘If we (or other shipown-
ers) don’t provide such a service, someone else will, and eventually may
be in a position to dominate liner conferences’.22 P&O’s chairman Sir
18Memo J. Nicholson, 31 May 1972, OA/JLA/box 7.
19Meek (2008, 136).
20Falkus (1990, 360).
21Gardner (1985, 195–197).
22Memo J. N. Nicholson, Container & Unit Load Service, 3 May 1965, OA/OCL box 61.
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Donald Anderson shared this view. In his opinion, cargo handling costs
were becoming ‘unacceptable’ to customers and mere ‘improvements on
the existing system’ were insufficient. ‘We believed that the liner trades
were coming under such pressure that they must soon be revolutionised,
and that containerisation was likely to be the most practical form which
the revolution could take’.23
The outcome was the establishment of Overseas Containers Ltd.
(OCL), a consortium consisting of Ocean, P&O, Furness Withy and
British & Commonwealth.24 OCL began its life in 1965 as ‘a Research
organisation set up to carry out a feasibility study’, not surprising given
that its task was to create a revolutionary transport system, starting with
a ‘clean slate’.25 From mid-1966, when it was decided to go ahead with
containerization on the UK–Australia route, OCL underwent a ‘rapid
transformation’ into a proper shipping consortium. Within two years,
OCL had to acquire ‘hardware …particularly ships, containers and a new
overall system of refrigeration’. A ‘comprehensive control and information
system’, shore establishments in theUK and Australia, a trunk haulage sys-
tem in the UK, a ‘radically new system of documentation’, and ‘a radically
new organisation for cargo procurement’ had to be designed and imple-
mented. Policy issues (industrial relations, personnel, pensions, PR) had
to be resolved and a financial and accounting structure created.26 Sales
staff had to be trained or re-trained and customers had to be familiarized
with the new way of shipping cargo, through measures including trial
container shipments on traditional ships and advice on how best to load
containers.27
Shipbuilders were faced with completely new challenges: ‘When work
first began early in 1966 on the design of these ships there was not a great
deal of precedent towork on…the commercial plannerswhowere endeav-
ouring to match the number of containers and size and speed of ship to
23D. F. Anderson, Draft private & confidential: Containerisation, 13 September 1966, OA/OCL
box 61.
24For the history of OCL, see Bott (2009).
25Circular to all senior staff, Organisation of O.C.L., 17 June 1966, OA/OCL box 61; ibid., 37;
Miller (2012, 333, 339, 341).
26Circular to all senior staff, Organisation of O.C.L., 17 June 1966, OA/OCL box 61.
27Bott (2009, 106).
7 Shipping as a Knowledge Industry: Research and Strategic … 165
the likely trade were also starting from scratch’.28 Research into container
ship technology lagged behind the building of such ships. Knowledge of
the required rigidity of container ships remained inconclusive well into
the 1970s, ‘long after these ships were first designed’. Experiments—such
as setting up various configurations of cranes andmocked-up loading bays
in an industrial yard to find the best way to get containers into the ship
and hold them in place—had to be undertaken to inform design because
neither theoretical models nor practical experience did yet exist.29
Under these circumstances, a number of measures had to be taken
to mitigate commercial and technological risks. Ample safety margins
were designed into these ships and, apart from the entirely new system
for storing and fixing the containers, they were built to a deliberately
conservative design, with a single-screw steam engine. They were also
designed to allow conversion into bulk carriers in case containerization
failed to take off. Many of these design choices had to be amended at a
later date. Sometimes, this was fortunate: excessive safety margins allowed
to increase cargo capacity by adding an extra layer of containers when
demand turned out to be even larger than anticipated. On the other
hand, the steam turbine engines were far too thirsty and powerful for
the post-1973 era of high bunker costs and ‘slow steaming’. They had to
be replaced with diesel engines in the 1980s. The most conservative, ‘safe’
aspect of these ships’ design was not necessarily commercially the most
successful.30
Both technologically and commercially, containerization was begun
under conditions of radical uncertainty—the new container ships’ sched-
ules, competition, loading times or the ports they were to call at were
yet unknown when the naval architects got to work. However, ‘for the
first time in dry cargo ship design the nature of the cargo [was] known
precisely. It [was] a predetermined number of boxes of standard size’.31
Thus, containers changed the role of knowledge in cargo handling. Before
containerization, officers, ratings and dockworkers had to draw on their
28Meek (1970, 1).
29Ibid., 40, 17–22. Mostert (1974, 70–75, 144–145) notes that supertankers likewise were experi-
mental ships of unproven (and often dubious!) quality.
30Meek (1970, 35).
31Ibid., 4.
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experience and specialized knowledge to solve ever-changing problems on
the spot every time cargo—in the shape of bags, drums, boxes, cars, live
animals for example—was moved into or out of the ship.With containers,
handling and stowing could be automated and engineered with great pre-
cision. An enormous amount of knowledge was embodied in the design
of interlocking systems, but once they were in place, little implicit knowl-
edge or traditional craft was required to operate them. Such knowledge
as was needed was of an explicit nature, easily recorded and taught, and
largely the same on every ship and in every port.
Containers thus emancipated transport from ‘the most costly, limited
and disturbing factor in cargo handling, the unpredictable and rightly or
wrongly pretentious human being’.32 Standardization and routinization
soon brought along computerization. Loading arrangements for Ocean’s
container ships were worked out by a computer and the data stored on
disks that were transported by aeroplane to arrive before the ship. Oper-
ating ships changed from art to science and from craft to industry. One of
Ocean’s key resources, the knowledge of how to operate cargo liners eco-
nomically and to high standards that had been developed and transmitted
over decades, suddenly lost its value.33 It was replaced by knowledge that
was explicit, codified and easily transmitted. Such commodified knowl-
edge transformed shipping from bottleneck to engine of global connec-
tivity, but it was no longer a resource that could underpin a company’s
long-term competitive advantage. Indeed, as Nicholas White points out
in this volume, by the 1980s, with infrastructure in place and knowledge
readily available, newcomers from Asia’s developing countries found it
relatively easy to enter the industry.
Nonetheless, containerization was profitable. After a difficult start,
OCL continuously outperformed other shipping companies as well as the
‘average for UK industrial and commercial companies’.34 More impor-
tantly, containers would soon change the way the world produced and
consumed goods, and allow the emergence of present-day transcontinental
supply chains and transnational corporations.Yet, themore shipping relied
32van den Burg (1969, 141); see also King (2000).
33This accumulated knowledge is described in Miller (2012, 95–103).
34Gardner (1985, 205 and Tables 4, 5).
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on explicit knowledge and codified procedure rather than tacit knowledge
and ad-hoc problem solving, the more it became commodified, favouring
large-scale, low-cost operators and putting pressure on conference arrange-
ments.35 Finally, while shipping became cheaper, quicker and more pre-
dictable for shippers, for those involved in operating ships, it became
routine and often boring.36
Management and Strategy
Introducing Strategic Planning
1965 marked not only the 100th anniversary of Ocean but also a number
of momentous changes for the company, including the establishment of
OCL as well as a reorganization of the fleet and flotation on the stock
market. Flotation—undertaken to demonstrate a high share price before
the introduction of capital gains tax in theUK—meant thatOcean became
vulnerable to take-over by investors interested in the company’s substantial
cash reserves and unused tax allowances. To preserve its independence,
Ocean had to make use of the resources it had accumulated.37 Ocean
was also aware that successful containerization of major routes would not
only destroy the value of its accumulated operational knowledge but also
make most of its traditional business obsolete, with a few container ships
replacing the entire fleet of nearly a hundred liners. While the Glenlyon
class ships spent 191 days at sea per year, the Priams managed 216 and the
Liverpool Bay container ships 300, achieving six to seven times as many
ton-miles per year as the Priams.38 The pressure that had been building
for the company to transform itself into something new now became
irresistible. From the late 1960s onwards, Ocean adopted a new company
structure, embarked on a diversification drive both within and outside
shipping and eventually disengaged from all marine activities, including
35Barber (2003).
36See Lane (1986) and Gerstenberger and Welke (2002).
37Falkus (1990, 334–336).
38Meek (2008, 167).
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container shipping. The direction of these changes, and no small part
of the impulse behind them, came from the systematic introduction and
implementation of the factual and conceptual knowledge that informs the
development of explicit business strategies.
Transformation meant diversification—using the company’s resources
(people, capital, tax allowances and so on) for other, ideally profitable, pur-
poses. To guide diversification, an explicit strategy was required. Around
this time, a whole new body of knowledge dealing with corporate strat-
egy emerged and was disseminated in business books, taught in business
schools and promoted by consultancy firms.39 Eventually, it became ‘the
framework by which companies understand what they’re doing and want
to do’, but this process took time.40 In the UK, ‘management thought
remained the product of relatively few intellectuals’ andnomore than3700
people were enrolled in management courses in 1966–1967.41 Ocean and
other shipping firms provided financial support for management courses
at university level ‘because … management education in general is so
important to this country’, even while deploring that universities focused
on postgraduate degrees and neglected the shorter and part-time courses
for mid-career managers industry demanded.42
Turning towards diversification, restructuring and explicit strategic
plans, the shipping industry followed the lead of many other interna-
tional businesses. At Ocean, the introduction of modern management
thought was the work of Sir Lindsay Alexander, a director responsible
for commercial development and then chairman from 1971 to 1980, and
of Nicholas Barber. Barber joined Ocean in 1964 as one of the ‘crown
princes’ or ‘student princes’, promising Oxbridge graduates the company
recruited from time to time with a view to fast-tracking them into senior
39For these developments, see Wilson and Thomson (2006, 117–123, 165–166) and Toms and
Wright (2002, 101–105).
40Kiechel (2010, 4). On the history of strategic management thought, see Freedman (2013, ch.
28–36) and Mintzberg (1994).
41Child (1969, 113–114).
42Memo H. B. Chrimes, 11 June 1970, OA/JLA/box 22.
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management.43 Back in Liverpool after two years in Singapore, he per-
suaded Alexander to send him on an 18-monthMBA course at Columbia
University in 1969–1971 and then stepped into a new role as the com-
pany’s Strategic Planner.44 His personal correspondence with Alexander
sheds light on this crucial period in the company’s development.45
Ocean’s strategic planning systems were created from scratch, based on
a review of how large US companies had introduced strategic planning.
Priorities were quickly established: the emphasis was to be on identifying
areas of development, because ‘the whole need for strategic planning has
arisen from our having to look for new business’; ‘real support at the top’
was considered necessary in order to get ‘people interested in longer term
problems which do not involve immediate operational pressures’, and
planning had to appear as Ocean’s ‘own activity rather than something
done by people looking like management consultants’.46
The Barber-Alexander correspondence led to a briefing document for
Ocean’s board, accompanied by a fuller version with background and
reflections added. It started from the assumption that ‘[a]ll companies
have a strategy but not usually explicitly,’ and that an explicit strategy was
particularly important when branching out into new business. Strategic
planning was to help the Board ‘[d]eterminewhat kind of Company Ocean
wants to become, particularly what businesses we expect to be in, for what
rewards / risks’. It was to be an annual process, seeking to make top and
middle management ‘planning minded (including budget-minded), i.e.
oriented to looking at the long term’. Planning was to become embed-
ded in the company’s processes and devolved from the Board and central
departments downwards to senior and middle managers. The job of the
Strategic Planning Division was ‘to ask awkward questions / insist on
43On Ocean’s recruitment strategies and the ‘student princes’, see Falkus (1990, 10, 18, 59, 283,
289).
44John Lindsay Alexander Papers, OA/JLA/box 7; personal communication, 25 October 2018.
45Barber to Alexander, 5 March 1970, 7 June 1970; Alexander to Barber, 9 March 1970, 18 June
1970; N. Barber, Basic approach to strategic planning, 30 March 1971, OA/JLA/box 7.
46Barber to Alexander, 23 August 1970, OA/JLA/box 7.
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answers / encourage management to do its own planning… It will (must)
not write its own answers. Paradoxically, planners should not plan’.47
Barber’s (andAlexander’s) starting pointwas that ‘O[cean]’smajor prob-
lem concerns strategic direction’. Asking ‘what kind of Company Ocean
wants to become’ not only led to a ‘master plan for the whole Company’,
but also to the setting of ‘objectives for the future in terms of profit, return
on investment and sales growth’.48 Once up and running, the system of
strategic planning and budgetary control would allow for the first time to
work on company strategy on the basis of detailed information on what
the individual divisions were doing, how they were performing and devel-
oping, and how efficient they were.49 Along with strategic planning, a
new company structure was introduced. While strategy was kept under
the control of Ocean’s managers, Boston Consulting Group was called in
to help with development of the new structure. The result was a multi-
divisional company structure that would free up resources for strategic
decision-making at Group level, with an Executive Committee free from
operational responsibility, while planning and decision-making would be
devolved to the operating divisions.
It is easy to dismiss these changes as little more than new jargon, or an
imitation of changes occurring inmany companies at the time: diversifica-
tion, bureaucratization and the creation of multi-divisional structures.50
But the aims, and effects, of Ocean’s strategic planning system were more
far-reaching. The fact that the company’s objectives were now stated in
terms of profit, return on investment and growth should not be underesti-
mated. So far, not making a loss and living up to self-set quality standards
had been the only guidelines for company strategy.Now, economic perfor-
mance indicators at least theoretically had gained primacy over other aims
and unspoken assumptions. While fully implementing this new outlook
would still take some considerable time, Ocean’s managers now began to
see themselves as business managers rather than shipowners.
47N. Barber, Brief for strategic planning, 9 March 1971, N. Barber, Strategic planning, 11 May
1971, OA/JLA/box 7. All quotations in this paragraph are from this document.
48Ibid.
49The operation of the system is described in the September 1972 Blue Book ‘Strategic Planning
and Budgetary Control’ (photocopy in possession of the author, kindly provided by David Riddle).
50Channon (1973).
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The dangers of a lack of explicit criteria and strategy are illustrated by
some of the attempts at diversification that Ocean had already under-
taken, for example a move into services and hotels in the Caribbean, and
diversification into new areas of shipping such as tankers, bulkers and liq-
uefied natural gas. The Caribbean ventures never became profitable and
nobody could in the end make sense of how they fitted in with the rest
of the company. The acquisition of the LNG tanker Nestor , ordered in
1970, nearly broke the company—it was built for a market that did not
materialize, went straight from the dockyard into layup and was sold off
in 1989, never having seen service. It later turned out that basic errors
were made in assessing the viability of the project.51
Strategic planning was supposed to prevent such mistakes by reviewing
the strengths and weaknesses of the company, the resources it had, the
markets it might move into, and the resources it would need to succeed.
Thorough analysis of Ocean’s resources soon revealed important weak-
nesses alongside the company’s acknowledged strengths. Ocean’s knowl-
edge was concentrated in a narrow, unfortunately increasingly irrelevant,
area: the operation of cargo liners in cartelized markets. In many other
areas, the company lacked knowledge and well-trained staff. To enable
Ocean to diversify and seize opportunities in other markets, new exper-
tise was required in areas such as finance, accounting, taxation, internal
audit, and personnel. Management in general was seen as a weakness,
with a shortage of general management skills and a lack of experience in
marketing, retailing, and ‘working to fine margins’. Accordingly, the first
exercises in strategic planning resulted in ‘mostly very poor’ plans and gave
‘no demonstration that the line manager really understands the business
he is in’.52 Falkus notes that before the early 1970s, Ocean’s rigid manage-
ment structure and lack of ‘financial and accounting expertise … made
the implementation of a coherent diversification plan well-nigh impossi-
ble’.53 Ocean’s people were good at operating ships but not at running a
business. Like other shipping companies, or the trading houses active in
disappearing colonial markets, Ocean had to accept that resources such as
51Falkus (1990, 342–344); Nicholas Barber, personal communication, 3 March 2016. Gardner
(1985, 205) argues that it was diversification that held back liner shipping profits over the 1970s.
52Barber to Alexander, 15 May 1972, OA/JLA/box 35.
53Falkus (1990, 291).
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accumulated skills and experience were being devalued by political change
such as decolonization and technological change such as containerization,
and were not easily transferable into other complex industries.54
Despite disappointment with the initial results, the strategic planning
exercise paid off quickly. Conducting a thorough assessment of threats,
aims and resources enabled Ocean to seize the opportunity when the ser-
vices company Cory came up for sale in 1972. Ocean quickly identified
Cory as a perfect match, Cory was bought and over the coming years,
Ocean’s shipping activities were gradually scaled down and Cory provided
the basis for the company’s transformation into an industrial services busi-
ness. Many of the managers brought in with Cory or recruited from other
non-shipping sectors at the same time would soon play leading roles in
Ocean. The mission of OCL, initially defined as achieving a dominant
position in container shipping, was redefined as providing the best possible
return on the parent companies’ investment.55 By the end of the 1980s,
Ocean, in Barber’s words, resembled a ‘Polo Mint’—a company formed
around a shipping core that no longer existed.56 Commercial knowledge,
including a heightened awareness of resources, costs and profitability led
to diversification away from the shipping industry—an activityOcean was
good at, but where the knowledge accumulated over more than a century
was no longer relevant due to the commodification of operations bulk and
container shipping had brought with them.
Implementing Strategic Planning
This brief big-picture summary should not distract from the consider-
able difficulties Ocean experienced trying to implement strategic think-
ing and budget-conscious management. By the mid-1970s, Ocean still
used an ‘amalgam of various accounting systems’, consolidation of which
remained a goal for the longer term.57 Developing human resources poli-
cies and procedures aligned with overall Group strategy took many years.
54A point made by Jones (2002, 220, 680–682, 761).
55Bott (2009, 144).
56Personal communication, 3 March 2016.
57Ocean Group Finance Division, Strategic Plan 1976–1980, OA/OCL/box 9.
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The transition out of liner shipping took much longer than expected, as
diversification within shipping failed dramatically and the newly-acquired
Cory businesses were slow to take off while traditional liner shipping busi-
ness declined more slowly than anticipated. The Cory businesses seemed
more responsive to planning than the old Ocean core. The shipping divi-
sions and in particular OFL, the staffing and maintenance division, often
adopted a defensive attitude, sensing that—even though they still con-
tributed the bulk of Group earnings and profits—their importance and
opportunities were declining. Far from implementing the strict focus on
return on capital required in the strategic planning process, in day-to-
day management, Ocean tried to keep up ‘fleet morale’ and shore up its
‘marine base’. In the short run, it seemed very costly to wind downmarine
activities while maintaining the reputation and identity of a ‘responsible
employer’, but in the longer run, opportunities to sell ships while they still
commanded reasonable prices were lost, and staff had to be made redun-
dant nonetheless, and in overall much worse labour market conditions.58
Elaborate strategic plans for all parts of the business had become part
of Ocean’s operational routines by the mid-1970s. These plans noted that
the process of planning had made operations more efficient generally, but
also that planning and forecasting had usually tended to ‘over-react to the
prevailing conditions at the time of planning’.59 More importantly, while
strategic planning could yield sharper insight into the nature of existing
difficulties and deficiencies, it often was less successful in finding alterna-
tive uses for Ocean’s resources. Mid-1970s strategic plans paint the picture
of a company that had few strategic options and was trapped by laws and
regulations in a declining sector and in an inflation-ridden economy con-
trolled by trade unions and a socialist government. The Group Personnel
Division’s plan for 1977–1981 noted that the strategic planning system
and its aim to allocate resources to the most promising markets was based
on the assumption of free markets, in particular for labour, which was no
longer correct. Even the basic notion of growth which was at the heart
58Marine Committee meetings, 28 November 1977, 24 June 1978, 7.A.1951-1. For further refer-
ences, see Petersson (2018).
59Group Strategic Plan 1977–1981, 4.B.1860.
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of both Ocean’s internal planning and BCG’s proposals had apparently
become ‘suspect’ in much of public discourse.60
‘The lack of indicated growth opportunities, combined with the capac-
ity to invest, is a major planning gap’, noted the 1976–1980Group Strate-
gic Plan. Probing questions were asked, but not answered: did Ocean
need new businesses or a new ‘product’ ‘to answer our longer term growth
requirements, and to enable us to escape from the increasing likelihood of
State interference and constraint in the service industries of transportation
and distribution?’ Could the answer be a move to overseas investment in
familiar businesses? ‘Or, does a new activity imply a new business alto-
gether, such as manufacturing? leisure? mining? engineering? or what?’61
These are the question the diversification literature at the time recom-
mended asking, and strategic planning made sure that such questions
were asked, the company’s situation was analyzed and growth opportu-
nities were sought.62 Ocean had begun to function as a business seeking
ways to achieve the best possible return on the capital employed. Yet,
solutions were not easy to find. Plans continued to highlight the need to
develop new activities in order to ‘balance the preponderance of mature
and declining businesses’, and to affirm: ‘We have very substantial capacity
to invest and few identified growth opportunities to enable us to exploit
these resources’. Asking entrepreneurial questions seemed easier than find-
ing entrepreneurial answers.63
Management Development
There was a practical as well as a strategic side to the increased atten-
tion paid to management knowledge as a corporate resource at Ocean
in the 1970s. Until then, training had been largely on-the-job, with no
systematic, formal training of management staff for specific roles. Barber
60Group Personnel Division Strategic Plan 1977–1981, in Rees (1987), Appendix 61, 10.
61Group Strategic Plan 1977–1981, 4.B.1860.
62Rich (1978a, b).
63Group Strategic Plan 1977–1981, 4.B.1860.
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bemoaned a lack of entrepreneurial spirit, along with an atmosphere char-
acterized by amateurism andpaternalism.64 A systematic effort to train and
empower managers was made alongside the introduction of strategic plan-
ning. Yet John D. Rees, who joined Ocean as management development
adviser in 1973, claims that the devolution of responsibility and leader-
ship too often was only a theoretical goal, whereas in practice the Board
were reluctant to give up control65—perhaps understandably, given the
deficiencies revealed by the first strategic plans. Rees saw the increased role
of formal knowledge as the signature of modern business. He tried to get
everyone on Ocean’s management development programme to read Peter
Drucker’sThe Age of Discontinuity—the main theme of which was the rise
of the knowledge society—as well as AlvinToffler’s Future Shock which, he
hoped, would ‘shake complacentmanagers into an awareness of changes in
their work environment and in the wider context of a post-industrial soci-
ety’.66 Rees’s management development programmes focused on aspects
that had become important under the new decentralized multidivisional
structure. In particular, personnel management techniques and proce-
dures were introduced, with all line managers becoming responsible for
appraising their staff and setting objectives closely aligned with company
and divisional strategic plans. Likewise, all managers had to brush up on
finance and accountancy.67
It is not easy to assess the overall effect of these changes.The transforma-
tion Ocean managers described as one from ‘family business style’ to ‘big
business style’68—a development that mirrored the gradual engagement
withmanagement weaknesses throughout British industry at the time69—
was more difficult to achieve in practice than to sketch out on paper. The
impact of managers brought in through the Cory acquisition shows that it
is often easier to acquire resources from outside than to develop them from
64Nicholas Barber, personal communication, 3 March 2016.
65Rees (1987, 33–35).
66Drucker (1969) and Toffler (1970). The quote is from Rees (1987, 87).
67Rees (1987) provides a narrative as well as detailed examples of the training courses introduced
while he was at Ocean.
68Falkus (1990, 350).
69Wilson and Thomson (2006, 41–42).
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scratch internally.70 Yet it appears plausible that both personnel manage-
ment and financial knowledge were essential to operating a business in the
1970s and beyond as labour relations were becoming more bureaucratic
and the company was focusing on the financial ‘bottom line’.What is clear
is that the Ocean of the 1970s and onwards fully understood the necessity
of systematically developing, distributing and applying modern manage-
ment knowledge throughout its senior workforce, as well as of recruiting,
nurturing and promoting skilled staff.
With strategic planning, diversification, management development and
implementation of the multi-divisional structure, the days where the
knowledge that underpinned Ocean’s competitive advantage was about
operating liner ships in a cartelized environment were gone. Systematic
strategic planning processes were now governing both ‘grand strategy’
at a group level, and detailed mapping out and budgeting of individual
divisions’ development over the medium term. But did the adoption of
strategic planning achieve its objectives and lead to a sustainable improve-
ment in performance? David Riddle, Barber’s successor as Ocean’s strate-
gic planner, argues that the ‘successful development of a broadly based
freight group [was] the result of the creation of business plans driven by
long term profitability and the move away from basic ship operations.
… I put it down to the introduction of planning and related report-
ing in the early 1970s’.71 The literature on strategic planning is often
much more sceptical about what could be achieved through the strict
application of strategic planning methodology, arguing that its formalis-
tic nature tended to prevent, rather than support, strategic thinking and
suffocate entrepreneurialism.72 Planning is described as designed for the
stable growth conditions of the 1960s and unsuited to the radical uncer-
tainty and heightened competition of the 1970s. Ocean’s experience seems
to lend qualified support to both sides of the argument. On the one hand,
the most fundamental strategic decisions were taken either before strategic
planning was fully in place or did not figure in the strategic plans (as with
70A point made by Wernerfelt (1984, 175).
71Personal communication, 1 August 2016, 30 November 2018.
72This is the main argument in Mintzberg (1994); see also Freedman (2013, 518).
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the acquisition of Cory), and planning did not providemuch help in iden-
tifying growth and investment opportunities in the 1970s. On the other
hand, though, strategic planning seems to have provided the tools required
to identify and assess strategic opportunities. Again, the Cory acquisition
is a prime example because though it was clearly an opportunistic move
it could not have been identified as a strategic opportunity without the
work already undertaken in the context of the introduction of strategic
planning. At the level of individual businesses, planning helped imple-
ment strategic decisions and keep a focus on commercial performance.
Within the resource-based framework adopted in this chapter, it can be
argued that strategic planning helpedmobilize and apply knowledge about
the company, its divisions, its customers, competitors and environment
both in strategic decision-making and in day-to-day implementation. It
thus seems to have fostered the systematic development of knowledge as a
corporate resource. As such, planning underpinned and enabled strategic
thinking and decision-making—what it could not, and at least in Ocean’s
case was not intended to, achieve was replace them.
Conclusion
Lutz Raphael highlights that all aspects of modern society are transfused
with concepts and findings derived from research (calling this, in untrans-
latableGerman, ‘Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen’).73 This chapter has
examined the role of formalized, research-based technological, operational
and conceptualmanagerial knowledge inOcean’s transformation.Many of
the changes discussed above were initiated by managers who studied aca-
demic publications on technology, business and society, while academic
researchers closely followed transformations in the corporate world.74 At
Ocean, knowledge was increasingly seen and nurtured as a key corporate
resource and explicit strategy was embodied in rolling five-year strategic
plans. Across all processes within the company, explicit and documented
knowledge took the place of tacit, experience-based knowledge. From the
73Raphael (1996).
74The preface to Channon (1973) provides an example.
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1950s, systematic research informed incremental changes in ship design
and operations. However, its impact remained limited. Only container-
ization would eventually remove key bottlenecks in cargo liner shipping.
Ocean was among the firms that pro-actively adopted and implemented
containerization, developing an interlocking system of technological and
operational innovations to make it work. This, however, had the effect of
devaluing the largely implicit, ad-hoc knowledge that underpinned the
competitive advantage of traditional liner shipping firms and replacing
it with standardized, commodified knowledge—an example of ‘how firm
resources and capabilities are accumulated and eroded’ and ‘how resources’
relative values may be affected by market changes’.75
While modern technology usually consists of explicit knowledge and
thus is easily accessible to those able to study it or to pay for it, it is much
more difficult to work out how or whether to use it. A resource-based per-
spective stresses the key role played by operational and strategic knowledge
in shaping and reacting to wider transformations. Here, Ocean’s focus
shifted from nurturing the craft of shipping towards running a business.
With the introduction of strategic planning, budgets, cost, profits and
return on capital moved centre stage. This shift in perspective eventually
transformed Ocean, but it was a gradual process involving change in per-
sonnel, large-scale training and cultural change as well as the change of
procedures and explicit strategy. The implementation issues encountered
along the way raise the question to what extent even companies operating
with a large body of explicit knowledge and well-document procedures
rely on tacit knowledge allowing employees to identify necessary shortcuts
and work to the spirit, rather than the letter, of the rules. Another aspect
that deserves to be highlighted is the effect of new types of knowledge on
power within the corporation.The introduction of strategic management,
performance planning and explicit targets for growth and profits served
to assert and legitimate the power of managers, and bolstered the interests
of shareholders.76
75Priem and Butler (2001).
76Child (1969, 22–23, 232–233) and Knights and Morgan (1991); see also Freedman (2013),
Mintzberg (1994), and Bott (2009, 189, 205–207).
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A focus on knowledge allows highlighting the agency of managers, as
well as the limits on that agency and the complexity of their task under
conditions of fundamental uncertainty. What they could not know, for
example, was to what extent their initiatives would succeed, which trans-
formations would unfold and which ones would falter, and how new
knowledge would ultimately become embodied in new types of institu-
tions and organizations. Containerization and diversification were initia-
tives dating back to the 1960s, a time of optimism and stable expansion,
but had to be implemented in the 1970s, a period of depressed growth,
high inflation and unpredictable structural change. The organizational
transformations of the 1970s were the key factor that unlocked the poten-
tial of the technological changes made in the 1950s and 1960s, eventu-
ally transforming shipping into an engine of globalization and the key
mechanism in global chains of production and consumption. However,
the transformations the industry underwent along the way were largely
unforeseen. In fact, applying business knowledge to the shipping industry
changed the industry so much that it became unviable for many of the
first movers to remain active in it.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Nicholas Barber CBE and David
Riddle (ex-Ocean) for sharing their ideas and answering my questions and Dr.
Chris Corker and Prof. Stig Tenold for reading suggestions.
References
Archival Sources
All archival sources referred to are part of the Ocean Group papers located in the
Merseyside Maritime Museum archives, Liverpool.
Published Sources
Barber, N. (2003). Ocean as a Liner Shipping Company. Nestorian, 20, 11.
180 N. P. Petersson
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage.
Journal of Management, 17, 99–120.
Barney, J. B. (2001). Is the Resource-Based “View” aUseful Perspective for Strate-
gic Management Research? Yes. The Academy of Management Review, 26 (1),
41–56.
Bott, A. (Ed.). (2009). British Box Business: A History of OCL. SCARA.
Channon, D. F. (1973).The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise. London:
Macmillan.
Child, J. (1969). British ManagementThought: A Critical Analysis. London: Allen
& Unwin.
Drucker, P. (1969). The Age of Discontinuity: Guideline to Our Changing Society.
London: Heinemann.
Falkus, M. (1990). The Blue Funnel Legend: A History of the Ocean Steam Ship
Company, 1865–1973. London: Macmillan.
Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy: A History. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gardner, B. (1985).The Container Revolution and Its Effects on the Structure of
Traditional UK Liner Shipping Companies. Maritime Policy & Management,
12 (3), 195–208.
Gerstenberger, H., & Welke, U. (2002). Seefahrt im Zeichen der Globalisierung.
Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
Goss, R. O. (1998). Rochdale Remembered: A PersonalMemoir.Maritime Policy
& Management, 25 (3), 213–233.
Goss, R. O. (2011). Strategies in British Shipping 1945–1970.Mariner’s Mirror,
97 (1), 243–258.
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm. Strategic
Management Journal, 17, 109–122.
Jones, G. (2002). Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jones, O., Ghobadian, A., O’Regan, N., & Antcliff, V. (2013). Dynamic Capa-
bilities in a Sixth-Generation Family Firm: Entrepreneurship and the Bibby
Line. Business History, 55 (6), 910–941.
Kiechel, W., III. (2010).The Lords of Strategy: The Secret Intellectual History of the
New Corporate World. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.
King, J. (2000).Technology and the Seafarer. Journal for Maritime Research, 2(1),
48–63.
Knights, D., & Morgan, G. (1991). Corporate Strategy, Organizations, and
Subjectivity: A Critique. Organization Studies, 12 (2), 251.
Lane, T. (1986). Grey Dawn Breaking: British Seafarers in the Late Twentieth
Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
7 Shipping as a Knowledge Industry: Research and Strategic … 181
Meek,M. (1964).Glenlyon Class: Design andOperation ofHigh-PoweredCargo
Liners. Royal Institution of Naval Architects: Quarterly Transactions, 106 (3),
241–285.
Meek, M. (1970). The First O.C.L. Container Ships. Royal Institution of Naval
Architects: Quarterly Transactions, 112 (1), 1–41.
Meek, M. (2008). There Go the Ships. County Durham: Memoir Club.
Meek,M., & Adams, R. (1969). “Priam” Class Cargo Liners—Design andOper-
ation. Royal Institution of Naval Architects: Quarterly Transactions, 111(3),
271–298.
Miller,M.B. (2012).Europe and theMaritimeWorld: ATwentiethCenturyHistory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mintzberg, H. (1994). The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. London: Prentice
Hall.
Mostert, N. (1974). Supership. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Obituary: Marshall Meek. (2013, September 29). The Daily Telegraph.
Penrose, E. (1959). Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Blackwell.
Petersson, N. P. (2018). Managing a “People Business” in Times of Uncertainty:
Human Resources Strategy at OceanTransport &Trading in the 1970s. Enter-
prise & Society, 19 (1), 88–123.
Priem, R. L., & Butler, J. E. (2001). Is the Resource-Based “View” a Useful
Perspective for Strategic Management Research?The Academy of Management
Review, 26 (1), 22–40.
Raphael, L. (1996).DieVerwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen alsmethodische und
konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhun-
derts. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 22 (2), 165–193.
Rees, J. D. (1987). A Study of Management and Organization Development in a
UK ShippingTransport andTrading Company, 1972–80 (MA thesis). Durham.
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Shipping. (1970). London: H.M.
Stationery Office.
Rich, C. A. (1978a). Corporate Planning in Shipping: Relating Theory to Prac-
tice, Pt. 1. Maritime Policy & Management, 5 (1), 31–38.
Rich, C. A. (1978b). Corporate Planning in Shipping: Relating Theory to Prac-
tice, Pt. 2: Corporate Strategy. Maritime Policy & Management, 5 (1), 39–50.
Spender, J. C. (1996). Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the
Firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 45–62.
Teece, D. J. (2016). Dynamic Capabilities and Entrepreneurial Management in
LargeOrganizations:Toward aTheory of the (Entrepreneurial) Firm.European
Economic Review, 86, 202–216.
Toffler, A. (1970). Future Shock. New York: Bantam.
182 N. P. Petersson
Toms, S., & Wright, M. (2002). Corporate Governance, Strategy and Structure
in British Business History, 1950–2000. Business History, 44 (3), 91–124.
van den Burg, G. (1969). Containerisation: A Modern Transport System. London:
Hutchinson.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A Resource-BasedView of the Firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5 (2), 171–180.
Wernerfelt, B. (1995). The Resource-Based View of the Firm: Ten Years After.
Strategic Management Journal, 16 (3), 171–174.
Wilson, J. F., &Thomson, A. (2006).TheMaking ofModernManagement: British
Management in Historical Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommer-
cial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if you modified the licensed
material. You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material
derived from this chapter or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
